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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
   
 
No. 15-2086  
_____________ 
 
 
DEBRA JOHNSON, 
                                   Appellant 
v. 
 
GLAXOSMITHKLINE, LLC;  
GLAXOSMITHKLINE HOLDINGS, INC.  
_____________ 
 
        
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court Nos.:  2-11-cv-05782 and 2-12-cv-05455) 
District Judge:  Honorable Paul S. Diamond 
       
 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on November 10, 2015 
 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, SHWARTZ and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion filed: January 5, 2016) 
   
 
O P I N I O N* 
   
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 Debra Johnson appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to 
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK). In the late 1950s, Johnson’s mother, while pregnant with her, 
had allegedly taken thalidomide distributed by GSK, which caused her to be born with 
birth defects. Johnson did not sue GSK for this alleged negligence until 2012, and the 
District Court granted summary judgment to GSK, holding her claim was barred by the 
one-year limitations period. We will affirm.   
I. Background  
 
 In February 1959, Johnson was born in Louisiana with severe birth defects. Since 
Johnson was a young child, her mother, Doris Williams, believed that she knew what had 
caused her daughter’s birth defects. During her pregnancy, she had taken what her doctor 
allegedly told her were experimental pills from Germany for morning sickness. Her 
suspicions were confirmed by her daughter’s doctor, who told her in the 1960s that other 
women who had taken these pills from Germany had given birth to children with injuries 
similar to her daughter’s.    
 Ms. Williams kept this information secret from Johnson—that is, until February 
13, 2012, when Ms. Williams was 80 and Johnson was 52. That day, Ms. Williams first 
told Johnson what she believed had caused her birth defects. Until that day, Johnson had 
never spoken with any family, friends, or doctors about what had possibly caused her 
birth defects. In fact, she had never done anything at all to investigate their cause.    
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 Two months later, on April 14, Johnson’s son called her to tell her to “google” the 
word “thalidomide” because he thought that she was a “textbook case.” Once she did, she 
saw pictures of birth defects caused by thalidomide, motivating her to further research the 
drug. She also dug out her medical records from her younger years. In the 1970s, she had 
taken these records from the hospital after she learned that they would be destroyed. 
These records described her injuries as “congenital” (present at birth) and “bilateral.” 
(App. 1228–29.) She had not looked at them until this time, prompted by her Internet 
research on thalidomide. She then filled out a law firm’s form that she found on the 
Internet.    
 Shortly thereafter, on September 24, 2012, she sued GSK. According to her 
complaint, in the 1950s, GSK had obtained thalidomide from a German company called 
Grunenthal and conducted limited U.S. clinical trials on mice and humans. Ms. Williams 
had allegedly taken thalidomide, resulting in Johnson’s defects.    
 GSK moved for summary judgment, arguing that Johnson’s claim was barred by 
Louisiana’s one-year limitations period. Johnson countered that the discovery rule tolled 
the limitations period until no earlier than one year before she filed her suit. The District 
Court disagreed and granted GSK summary judgment. On appeal, she contests this 
ruling.  
 
II. Discussion1 
                                              
1 Our review of a District Court’s grant of summary judgment is plenary. Although the 
statute-of-limitations is usually an affirmative defense, here, Johnson would bear the 
burden at trial to prove that her claim is timely, because her claim is time barred on the 
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 The District Court ruled that Louisiana law applied (that ruling is not challenged 
on appeal). Under that state’s law, Johnson’s personal injury claim is subject to a one-
year limitations period, which begins “to run from the day injury or damage is sustained.” 
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3492. As a result, because Johnson sustained her injuries at birth, 
the one-year statute-of-limitations bars her claim unless she can toll it until at least 
September 24, 2011—one year before she filed her lawsuit.  
 Johnson argues that the discovery rule tolled the one-year limitations period until 
at least September 24, 2011. This rule tolls the limitations period until “the date the 
injured party discovers or should have discovered the facts upon which [her] cause of 
action is based.” Davis v. Johnson, 36 So. 3d 439, 441 (La. Ct. App. 2010). But a 
plaintiff’s ignorance of the facts on which her claim is based cannot be “attributable to 
[her] own willfulness or neglect; that is, a plaintiff will be deemed to know what [she] 
could by reasonable diligence have learned.” Corsey v. La. Dep’t Corr., 375 So. 2d 1319, 
1322 (La. 1979). Johnson claims that she neither knew nor reasonably could have known 
that thalidomide had caused her birth defects until at least September 24, 2011.  
 The District Court addressed Johnson’s argument that her mother’s knowledge 
should not be imputed to her, and concluded that because Louisiana law does not permit 
retroactive application of its minor tolling statute, her mother’s knowledge would be 
                                                                                                                                                  
face of her complaint. See Wells v. Zadeck, 89 So. 3d 1145, 1149–50 (La. 2012). On 
summary judgment, then, GSK only had to discharge its burden of production, at which 
point the burden shifted to Johnson to show a genuine issue of material fact on her 
argument that her claim was timely. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 
(1986). 
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imputed to Johnson.  It then proceeded to discuss the discovery rule as applied to the set 
of facts known to Williams, and concluded that her “suspicions obligated Ms. Williams 
to exercise reasonable diligence is ascertaining the cause of her daughter’s injuries.”    
(App 16.)  Thus, the statute of limitations ran long before Johnson instituted the instant 
action.  The District Court also correctly reasoned that, even if Williams’ knowledge was 
not imputed to Johnson, Johnson never investigated the cause of her injuries, and “even a 
cursory inquiry would have provided Plaintiff with abundant information concerning the 
connection between thalidomide and her birth defects.” (App 18.)  The District Court 
properly rejected Johnson’s other arguments, namely contesting the Court’s refusal to 
credit her expert, as well as her argument that her inaction was caused by GSK’s 
fraudulent concealment. 
 We find the District Court’s analysis to be correct in all respects and will therefore 
affirm its grant of GSK’s motion for summary judgment. 
